Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/27163 
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dc.contributor.authorStremitzer, Alexanderen
dc.date.accessioned2008-01-23-
dc.date.accessioned2009-08-06T12:40:54Z-
dc.date.available2009-08-06T12:40:54Z-
dc.date.issued2008-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/27163-
dc.description.abstractWe consider a model of a single defendant and N plaintiffs where the total cost of litigation is fixed on the part of the plaintiffs and shared among the members of a suing coalition. By settling and dropping out of the coalition, a plaintiff therefore creates a negative externality on the other plaintiffs. It was shown in Che and Spier (2007) that failure to internalize this externality can often be exploited by the defendant. However, if plaintiffs make sequential take-it-or-leave-it settlement offers, we can show that they will actually be exploited by one of their fellow plaintiffs rather than by the defendant. Moreover, if litigation is a public good as is the case in shareholder derivative suits, parties may fail to reach a settlement even having complete information. This may explain why we observe derivative suits in the US but not in Europe.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aUniversity of Bonn, Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE) |cBonnen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aBonn Econ Discussion Papers |x2/2008en
dc.subject.jelK41en
dc.subject.jelC7en
dc.subject.jelH4en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordlitigationen
dc.subject.keywordsettlementen
dc.subject.keywordbargainingen
dc.subject.keywordcontracting with externalitiesen
dc.subject.keywordderivative suitsen
dc.subject.keywordpublic goodsen
dc.subject.stwZivilprozessen
dc.subject.stwVerhandlungstheorieen
dc.subject.stwVertragstheorieen
dc.subject.stwExterner Effekten
dc.subject.stwÖffentliches Guten
dc.subject.stwTheorieen
dc.titlePlaintiffs exploiting Plaintiffs-
dc.type|aWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn557268397en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:zbw:bonedp:22008-

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