Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/271257 
Year of Publication: 
2022
Series/Report no.: 
QMS Research Paper No. 2022/02
Publisher: 
Queen's University Belfast, Queen's Management School, Belfast
Abstract: 
How should students be assigned to schools? Two mechanisms have been suggested and implemented around the world: deferred acceptance (DA) and top trading cycles (TTC). These two mechanisms are widely considered excellent choices owing to their outstanding stability and incentive properties. We show theoretically and empirically that both mechanisms perform poorly with regard to two key desiderata such as efficiency and equality, even in large markets. In contrast, the rank-minimizing mechanism is significantly more efficient and egalitarian. It is also Pareto optimal for the students, unlike DA, and generates less justified envy than TTC
JEL: 
C78
D73
C78
D73
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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