Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/271119 
Year of Publication: 
2023
Series/Report no.: 
WZB Discussion Paper No. SP II 2023-202
Publisher: 
Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung (WZB), Berlin
Abstract: 
We study the random assignment of indivisible objects among a set of agents with strict preferences. Random Serial Dictatorship is known to be only ex-post efficient and there exist mechanisms which Pareto-dominate it ex ante. However, we show that there is no mechanism that is likewise (i) strategy-proof and (ii) boundedly invariant, and that Paretodominates Random Serial Dictatorship. Moreover, the same holds for all mechanisms that are ex-post efficient, strategy-proof, and boundedly invariant: no such mechanism is dominated by any other mechanism that is likewise strategy-proof and boundedly invariant.
Subjects: 
random assignment
strategy-proofness
ex-post efficiency
bounded invariance
JEL: 
D63
D70
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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