Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/270961 
Year of Publication: 
2023
Series/Report no.: 
Ruhr Economic Papers No. 1016
Publisher: 
RWI - Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung, Essen
Abstract: 
We consider a simple contest game with draws where with some probability none of the contestants is selected as winner. If such an outcome occurs, then the contest is repeated in the next period unless either one of the contestants wins the prize or until a final last period is reached. Allowing for finite as well as infinite time horizons and different variations in the timing of effort decisions, the theoretical analysis of this model reveals that the dynamic contest structure has profound implications for intertemporal effort substitution and contest revenue.
Subjects: 
Contest theory
repeated contest
dynamic contest
contest with draws
JEL: 
C72
C73
D72
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
ISBN: 
978-3-96973-182-6
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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