Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/27003
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dc.contributor.authorMunshi, Kaivanen_US
dc.contributor.authorRosenzweig, Mark Richarden_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-08-06T09:44:45Z-
dc.date.available2009-08-06T09:44:45Z-
dc.date.issued2008en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/27003-
dc.description.abstractParochial politics is typically associated with poor leadership and low levels of public good provision. This paper explores the possibility that community involvement in politics need not necessarily worsen governance and, indeed, can be efficiency-enhancing when the context is appropriate. Complementing the new literature on the role of community networks in solving market problems, we test the hypothesis that strong traditional social institutions can discipline the leaders they put forward, successfully substituting for secular political institutions when they are ineffective. Using new data on Indian local governments at the ward level over multiple terms, and exploiting the randomized election reservation system, we find that the presence of a numerically dominant sub-caste (caste equilibrium) is associated with the selection of leaders with superior observed characteristics and with greater public good provision. This improvement in leadership competence occurs without apparently diminishing leaders' responsiveness to their constituency.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisher|aYale Univ., Economic Growth Center|cNew Haven, Conn.en_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aCenter discussion paper // Economic Growth Center|x964en_US
dc.subject.jelH11en_US
dc.subject.jelH44en_US
dc.subject.jelO12en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordpoliticsen_US
dc.subject.keywordcommitmenten_US
dc.subject.keywordgovernanceen_US
dc.titleThe efficacy of parochial politics: caste, commitment, and competence in Indian local governmentsen_US
dc.type|aWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn593378717en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-

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