Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/27003 
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dc.contributor.authorMunshi, Kaivanen
dc.contributor.authorRosenzweig, Mark Richarden
dc.date.accessioned2009-08-06T09:44:45Z-
dc.date.available2009-08-06T09:44:45Z-
dc.date.issued2008-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/27003-
dc.description.abstractParochial politics is typically associated with poor leadership and low levels of public good provision. This paper explores the possibility that community involvement in politics need not necessarily worsen governance and, indeed, can be efficiency-enhancing when the context is appropriate. Complementing the new literature on the role of community networks in solving market problems, we test the hypothesis that strong traditional social institutions can discipline the leaders they put forward, successfully substituting for secular political institutions when they are ineffective. Using new data on Indian local governments at the ward level over multiple terms, and exploiting the randomized election reservation system, we find that the presence of a numerically dominant sub-caste (caste equilibrium) is associated with the selection of leaders with superior observed characteristics and with greater public good provision. This improvement in leadership competence occurs without apparently diminishing leaders' responsiveness to their constituency.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aYale University, Economic Growth Center |cNew Haven, CTen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aCenter Discussion Paper |x964en
dc.subject.jelH11en
dc.subject.jelH44en
dc.subject.jelO12en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordpoliticsen
dc.subject.keywordcommitmenten
dc.subject.keywordgovernanceen
dc.titleThe efficacy of parochial politics: caste, commitment, and competence in Indian local governments-
dc.type|aWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn593378717en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:egc:wpaper:964en

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