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Erscheinungsjahr: 
2008
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Center Discussion Paper No. 961
Verlag: 
Yale University, Economic Growth Center, New Haven, CT
Zusammenfassung: 
PTAs are generally negotiated without any tariff concessions or transfers to non-member countries. Can such a PTA benefit the neighbors' welfare? In a two-good competitive equilibrium model in the absence of an entrepôt, a PTA without concessions to the outside will hurt the outsider's welfare when goods are normal. If one of the member countries is an entrepôt, however, it definitely improves the neighbors' welfare. In a multiple-good model, a PTA without concessions deteriorates the neighbors' welfare, provided that all the goods are normal and substitutes, and that initial tariff levels are small.
Schlagwörter: 
PTA
neighbor's welfare
Kemp-Wan theorem
WTO
GATT article 24
Entrepôt
JEL: 
F11
F13
F15
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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