Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/27000
Authors: 
Endoh, Masahiro
Hamada, Koichi
Shimomura, Koji
Year of Publication: 
2008
Series/Report no.: 
Center discussion paper // Economic Growth Center 961
Abstract: 
PTAs are generally negotiated without any tariff concessions or transfers to non-member countries. Can such a PTA benefit the neighbors' welfare? In a two-good competitive equilibrium model in the absence of an entrepôt, a PTA without concessions to the outside will hurt the outsider's welfare when goods are normal. If one of the member countries is an entrepôt, however, it definitely improves the neighbors' welfare. In a multiple-good model, a PTA without concessions deteriorates the neighbors' welfare, provided that all the goods are normal and substitutes, and that initial tariff levels are small.
Subjects: 
PTA
neighbor's welfare
Kemp-Wan theorem
WTO
GATT article 24
Entrepôt
JEL: 
F11
F13
F15
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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