Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/26999 
Kompletter Metadatensatz
DublinCore-FeldWertSprache
dc.contributor.authorEngel, Eduardo M. R. A.en
dc.contributor.authorFischer, Ronald D.en
dc.date.accessioned2009-08-06T09:44:42Z-
dc.date.available2009-08-06T09:44:42Z-
dc.date.issued2008-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/26999-
dc.description.abstractThe government contracts with a foreign firm to extract a natural resource that requires an upfront investment and which faces price uncertainty. In states where profits are high, there is a likelihood of expropriation, which generates a social cost that increases with the expropriated value. In this environment, the planner's optimal contract avoids states with high probability of expropriation. The contract can be implemented via a competitive auction with reasonable informational requirements. The bidding variable is a cap on the present value of discounted revenues, and the firm with the lowest bid wins the contract. The basic framework is extended to incorporate government subsidies, unenforceable investment effort and political moral hazard, and the general thrust of the results described above is preserved.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aYale University, Economic Growth Center |cNew Haven, CTen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aCenter Discussion Paper |x960en
dc.subject.jelQ33en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordTaxationen
dc.subject.keywordminingen
dc.subject.keywordrent extractionen
dc.subject.keywordroyaltyen
dc.subject.keywordnon-renewable natural resourceen
dc.subject.keywordpresentvalue-of-revenue auctionen
dc.titleOptimal resource extraction contracts under threat of expropriation-
dc.type|aWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn593377117en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:egc:wpaper:960en

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe
210.25 kB





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.