Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/26970
Authors: 
Goldstein, Markus
Udry, Christopher
Year of Publication: 
2005
Series/Report no.: 
Center discussion paper // Economic Growth Center 929
Abstract: 
We examine the impact of ambiguous and contested land rights on investment and productivity in agricultural in Akwapim, Ghana. We show that individuals who hold powerful positions in a local political hierarchy have more secure tenure rights, and that as a consequence they invest more in land fertility and have substantially higher output. The intensity of investments on different plots cultivated by a given individual correspond to that individual’s security of tenure over those specific plots, and in turn to the individual`s position in the political hierarchy relevant to those specific plots. We interpret these results in the context of a simple model of the political allocation of land rights in local matrilineages.
Subjects: 
Land tenure
investment
institutions
JEL: 
O12
O13
O17
P48
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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