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dc.contributor.authorBond, Philipen
dc.contributor.authorPande, Rohinien
dc.date.accessioned2009-08-06T09:44:17Z-
dc.date.available2009-08-06T09:44:17Z-
dc.date.issued2005-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/26967-
dc.description.abstractIndividuals' inability to coordinate investment may significantly constrain economic development. In this paper we study a simple investment game characterized by multiple equilibria and ask whether an income-based incentive scheme can uniquely implement the high investment outcome. A general property of this game is the presence of a crossover investment point at which an individual's incomes from investment and non-investment are equal. We show that arbitrarily small errors in the government's knowledge of this crossover point can prevent unique implementation of the high investment outcome. We conclude that informational requirements are likely to severely limit a government's ability to use income-based incentive schemes as a coordination device.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aYale University, Economic Growth Center |cNew Haven, CTen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aCenter Discussion Paper |x924en
dc.subject.jelO21en
dc.subject.jelH23en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordCoordinationen
dc.subject.keywordpublic policyen
dc.subject.keywordincome taxationen
dc.subject.keywordimplementationen
dc.titleCoordinating development: Can income-based incentive schemes eliminate pareto inferior equilibria?-
dc.type|aWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn592950999en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:egc:wpaper:924en

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