Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/26967
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dc.contributor.authorBond, Philipen_US
dc.contributor.authorPande, Rohinien_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-08-06T09:44:17Z-
dc.date.available2009-08-06T09:44:17Z-
dc.date.issued2005en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/26967-
dc.description.abstractIndividuals' inability to coordinate investment may significantly constrain economic development. In this paper we study a simple investment game characterized by multiple equilibria and ask whether an income-based incentive scheme can uniquely implement the high investment outcome. A general property of this game is the presence of a crossover investment point at which an individual's incomes from investment and non-investment are equal. We show that arbitrarily small errors in the government's knowledge of this crossover point can prevent unique implementation of the high investment outcome. We conclude that informational requirements are likely to severely limit a government's ability to use income-based incentive schemes as a coordination device.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisher|aYale Univ., Economic Growth Center|cNew Haven, Conn.en_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aCenter discussion paper // Economic Growth Center|x924en_US
dc.subject.jelO21en_US
dc.subject.jelH23en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordCoordinationen_US
dc.subject.keywordpublic policyen_US
dc.subject.keywordincome taxationen_US
dc.subject.keywordimplementationen_US
dc.titleCoordinating development: Can income-based incentive schemes eliminate pareto inferior equilibria?en_US
dc.type|aWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn592950999en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-

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