Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/26961 
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dc.contributor.authorNicklisch, Andreasen
dc.date.accessioned2008-07-23-
dc.date.accessioned2009-08-06T09:28:16Z-
dc.date.available2009-08-06T09:28:16Z-
dc.date.issued2008-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/26961-
dc.description.abstractThis article reports the results of a simple bargaining experiment on the ultimatum-revenge game. The game enables to differentiate between fairness that is stimulated by intentional based motives, distributional motives, and fairness considerations that mix both motives. The laboratory experiments indicate considerable heterogeneity of motives. A majority of subjects seem to combine both motives. However, the composition of the mix is subject to a transition, which can be formalized by the principle of appropriateness. In contrast to contemporary reciprocity models, this approach suggests that mildly unkind treatments are responded mildly unkindly, while strong unkindness leads to harsh reactions.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aMax Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods |cBonnen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aPreprints of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods |x2008,24en
dc.subject.jelD63en
dc.subject.jelD64en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keyworddistributional preferencesen
dc.subject.keywordfairnessen
dc.subject.keywordintentional based preferencesen
dc.subject.keywordsocial welfareen
dc.subject.keywordultimatum bargainingen
dc.subject.stwVerhandlungstheorieen
dc.subject.stwVerteilungsgerechtigkeiten
dc.subject.stwReziprozitäten
dc.subject.stwTesten
dc.titleInequity aversion, reciprocity, and appropriateness in the ultimatum-revenge game-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn572388799en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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