Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/26961
Full metadata record
DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorNicklisch, Andreasen_US
dc.date.accessioned2008-07-23en_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-08-06T09:28:16Z-
dc.date.available2009-08-06T09:28:16Z-
dc.date.issued2008en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/26961-
dc.description.abstractThis article reports the results of a simple bargaining experiment on the ultimatum-revenge game. The game enables to differentiate between fairness that is stimulated by intentional based motives, distributional motives, and fairness considerations that mix both motives. The laboratory experiments indicate considerable heterogeneity of motives. A majority of subjects seem to combine both motives. However, the composition of the mix is subject to a transition, which can be formalized by the principle of appropriateness. In contrast to contemporary reciprocity models, this approach suggests that mildly unkind treatments are responded mildly unkindly, while strong unkindness leads to harsh reactions.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisher|aMax Planck Inst. for Research on Collective Goods|cBonnen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aPreprints of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods|x2008,24en_US
dc.subject.jelD63en_US
dc.subject.jelD64en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keyworddistributional preferencesen_US
dc.subject.keywordfairnessen_US
dc.subject.keywordintentional based preferencesen_US
dc.subject.keywordsocial welfareen_US
dc.subject.keywordultimatum bargainingen_US
dc.subject.stwVerhandlungstheorieen_US
dc.subject.stwVerteilungsgerechtigkeiten_US
dc.subject.stwReziprozitäten_US
dc.subject.stwTesten_US
dc.titleInequity aversion, reciprocity, and appropriateness in the ultimatum-revenge gameen_US
dc.type|aWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn572388799en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-

Files in This Item:
File
Size
664.49 kB





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.