Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/26954 
Kompletter Metadatensatz
DublinCore-FeldWertSprache
dc.contributor.authorCrivelli, Ernestoen
dc.contributor.authorStaal, Klaasen
dc.date.accessioned2008-07-23-
dc.date.accessioned2009-08-06T09:28:11Z-
dc.date.available2009-08-06T09:28:11Z-
dc.date.issued2008-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/26954-
dc.description.abstractThere is much evidence against the so-called too big to fail hypothesis in the case of bailouts to subnational governments. We look at a model where districts of different size provide local public goods with positive spillovers. Matching grants of a central government can induce so-cially-efficient provision, but districts can still exploit the intervening central government by induc-ing direct financing. We show that the ability and willingness of a district to induce a bailout and district size are negatively correlated. We also discuss the effect economies of scale in local public goods provision has on the bailout policies and argue that these policies can be subgame perfect equilibrium strategies.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aMax Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods |cBonnen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aPreprints of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods |x2008,17en
dc.subject.jelH4en
dc.subject.jelH7en
dc.subject.jelR1en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordbailoutsen
dc.subject.keywordsoft-budget constraintsen
dc.subject.keyworddistrict sizeen
dc.subject.keywordspilloversen
dc.subject.stwGemeindefinanzenen
dc.subject.stwGroßstadten
dc.subject.stwBudgetrestriktionen
dc.subject.stwFinanzausgleichen
dc.subject.stwLokales öffentliches Guten
dc.subject.stwSpillover-Effekten
dc.subject.stwTheorieen
dc.titleSize, spillovers and soft budget constraints-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn572378505en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe
509.89 kB





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.