Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/26928
Authors: 
Jansen, Jos
Year of Publication: 
2007
Series/Report no.: 
Preprints of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2007,13
Abstract: 
I study the incentives of oligopolists to acquire and disclose information on a common demand intercept. Since firms may fail to acquire information even when they invest in information acquisition, firms can credibly conceal unfavorable news while disclosing favorable news. Firms may earn higher expected profits under such a selective disclosure regime than under the regimes where firms commit to share all or no information. In particular, this holds under both Cournot and Bertrand competition, if the firms have sufficiently flat information acquisition cost functions. For steeper cost functions Cournot duopolists prefer strategic disclosure, if their goods are sufficiently differentiated.
Subjects: 
oligopolistic competition
information acquisition
information sharing
commitment
common value
product differentiation
JEL: 
D82
D83
L13
L40
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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