Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/26889 
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dc.contributor.authorHöffler, Felixen
dc.contributor.authorWittmann, Tobiasen
dc.date.accessioned2006-05-23-
dc.date.accessioned2009-08-06T09:27:22Z-
dc.date.available2009-08-06T09:27:22Z-
dc.date.issued2006-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/26889-
dc.description.abstractScarce interconnector capacities are a severe obstacle to transregional competition and a unified market for electricity in the European Union. However, physically the interconnectors are rarely used up to capacity. This is due to the fact that the current allocation schemes make only limited use of the fact that currents in opposing directions cancel out. We propose a netting auction mechanism which makes use of this and in which even small transmission capacities can generate large competitive pressure in adjacent markets. Netting increases the usage of capacity and reduces the auctioneer's incentive to withhold capacity from the auction.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aMax Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods |cBonnen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aPreprints of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods |x2006,5en
dc.subject.jelL94en
dc.subject.jelD44en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordDivisible good auctionsen
dc.subject.keywordinterconnectoren
dc.subject.keywordelectricity marktesen
dc.subject.keywordcompetition policyen
dc.subject.stwStromnetzen
dc.subject.stwKapazitätsauslastungen
dc.subject.stwAuktionen
dc.subject.stwElektrizitäten
dc.subject.stwTheorieen
dc.subject.stwEU-Staatenen
dc.titleNetting of capacity in interconnector auctions-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn512217033en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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