Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/26866 
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dc.contributor.authorGaube, Thomasen
dc.date.accessioned2005-05-02-
dc.date.accessioned2009-08-06T09:27:05Z-
dc.date.available2009-08-06T09:27:05Z-
dc.date.issued2005-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/26866-
dc.description.abstractThis paper deals with second-best pollution taxation by investigating allocations instead of the corresponding tax rates. Assuming certain restrictions on utility and that the marginal revenue from environmental taxation is positive, it is shown that environmental quality is higher in second best where only distortionary taxes are used to finance public expenditures than in the first-best optimum where lump-sum taxes are available.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aMax Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods |cBonnen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aPreprints of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods |x2005,9en
dc.subject.jelH21en
dc.subject.jelH41en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordenvironmental taxationen
dc.subject.keywordpublic goodsen
dc.subject.stwÖkosteueren
dc.subject.stwUmweltbelastungen
dc.subject.stwSecond Besten
dc.subject.stwSteuerwirkungen
dc.subject.stwTheorieen
dc.titleSecond-best pollution taxation and environmental quality-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn485073072en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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