Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/26842
Authors: 
Schmitz, Hendrik
Year of Publication: 
2008
Series/Report no.: 
Ruhr economic papers 76
Abstract: 
Deductibles in health insurance are often regarded as a means to contain health care costs when individuals exhibit moral hazard. However, in the absence of moral hazard, voluntarily chosen deductibles may instead lead to self-selection into different insurance contracts. We use a set of new variables in the German Socioeconomic Panel for the years 2002, 2004, and 2006 that measure individual health more accurately and include risk-attitudes towards health in order to determine the price elasticity of demand for health care. A latent class approach that takes into account the panel structure of the data reveals that the effect of deductibles on the number of doctor visits is negligible. Private add-on insurance increases the number of doctor visits. However, altogether the effects of the insurance state on the demand for doctor visits are small in magnitude.
Subjects: 
Health insurance
deductibles
add-on insurance
count data
latent class panel model
JEL: 
I11
I18
G22
ISBN: 
978-3-86788-081-7
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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