Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/268243 
Year of Publication: 
2022
Series/Report no.: 
ZEW Discussion Papers No. 22-064
Publisher: 
ZEW - Leibniz-Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung, Mannheim
Abstract: 
We study mechanism design with flexible but costly information acquisition. There is a principal and four or more agents, sharing a common prior over the set of payoff-relevant states. The principal proposes a mechanism to the agents who can then acquire information about the state of the world by privately designing a signal device. As long as it is costless for each agent to acquire a signal that is independent from the state, we show that there exists a mechanism which allows the principal to implement any social choice rule at zero information acquisition cost to the agents.
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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