Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/268024 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2022
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
ECONtribute Discussion Paper No. 191
Verlag: 
University of Bonn and University of Cologne, Reinhard Selten Institute (RSI), Bonn and Cologne
Zusammenfassung: 
A seller with commitment power sets prices over time. Risk-averse buyers arrive to the market and decide when to purchase. We obtain that the optimal price path is a "regular" price, with occasional episodes of sequential discounts that occur at random times. The optimal price path has the property that the price a buyer ends up paying is independent of his arrival and purchase times, and only depends on his valuation. Our theory accommodates empirical findings on the timing of discounts.
Schlagwörter: 
dynamic pricing
sales
random mechanisms
JEL: 
D82
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

Datei(en):
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