Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/267799 
Autor:innen: 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2022
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
ISER Discussion Paper No. 1187
Verlag: 
Osaka University, Institute of Social and Economic Research (ISER), Osaka
Zusammenfassung: 
We consider the problem of allocating a single object to the agents with payments. Agents have preferences that are not necessarily quasi-linear. We characterize the class of rules satisfying pairwise strategy-proofness and non-imposition by the priority rule. Our characterization result remains valid even if we replace pairwise strategy-proofness by either weaker effectively pairwise strategy-proofness or stronger group strategy-proofness. By exploiting our characterization, we identify the class of rules satisfying both the properties that are in addition (i) onto, (ii) welfare continuous, (iii) minimally fair , (iv) constrained efficient within the class of rules satisfying both the properties, or (v) revenue undominated within the class of rules satisfying the properties, and find the tension between minimal properties of efficiency, fairness, and revenue maximization under pairwise strategy-proofness.
Schlagwörter: 
Pairwise strategy-proofness
Effectively pairwise strategy-proofness
Group strategy-proofness
Non-imposition
Efficiency
Fairness
Revenue maximization
Priority rules
JEL: 
D44
D47
D71
D82
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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