Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/267799 
Year of Publication: 
2022
Series/Report no.: 
ISER Discussion Paper No. 1187
Publisher: 
Osaka University, Institute of Social and Economic Research (ISER), Osaka
Abstract: 
We consider the problem of allocating a single object to the agents with payments. Agents have preferences that are not necessarily quasi-linear. We characterize the class of rules satisfying pairwise strategy-proofness and non-imposition by the priority rule. Our characterization result remains valid even if we replace pairwise strategy-proofness by either weaker effectively pairwise strategy-proofness or stronger group strategy-proofness. By exploiting our characterization, we identify the class of rules satisfying both the properties that are in addition (i) onto, (ii) welfare continuous, (iii) minimally fair , (iv) constrained efficient within the class of rules satisfying both the properties, or (v) revenue undominated within the class of rules satisfying the properties, and find the tension between minimal properties of efficiency, fairness, and revenue maximization under pairwise strategy-proofness.
Subjects: 
Pairwise strategy-proofness
Effectively pairwise strategy-proofness
Group strategy-proofness
Non-imposition
Efficiency
Fairness
Revenue maximization
Priority rules
JEL: 
D44
D47
D71
D82
Document Type: 
Working Paper

Files in This Item:
File
Size
292.04 kB





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.