Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/26769
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dc.contributor.authorLeininger, Wolfgangen_US
dc.contributor.authorOckenfels, Axelen_US
dc.date.accessioned2007-05-04en_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-08-06T09:01:36Z-
dc.date.available2009-08-06T09:01:36Z-
dc.date.issued2007en_US
dc.identifier.isbn978-3-936454-94-9en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/26769-
dc.description.abstractWe document an increase in the scoring probability from penalties in soccer, which separates the time period before 1974 significantly from that after 1976: the scoring probability increased by 11%.We explain this finding by arguing that the institution of penalty-shooting before 1974 is best described as a standard of behaviour for striker and goal-keeper, which in game-theoretic terms represents a 2x2-game. In contrast to this, after 1976 the institution of the penalty-duel is best described by a 3x3 game form constrained by certain behavioural rules. Those rules can be parameterized by a single parameter, which nevertheless allows the theoretical reproduction (and hence explanation) of all the empirically documented regularities.The scoring probability in equilibrium of the latter institution is higher than in the former one.We present historical evidence to the effect, that this change in the perception of penalty- duels (as two different games), was caused by Johan Neeskens' shrewd and 'revolutionary' penalty-taking during World-Cup 1974, when he shot a penalty in the first minute of the final between Germany and the Netherlands right into the middle of the goalmouth.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisher|aRWI|cEssenen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aRuhr economic papers|x4en_US
dc.subject.jelD01en_US
dc.subject.jelC72en_US
dc.subject.jelD74en_US
dc.subject.jelC93en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordProfessional socceren_US
dc.subject.keywordmixed strategy equilibriumen_US
dc.subject.keywordinstitutional designen_US
dc.subject.stwFußballsporten_US
dc.subject.stwSpieltheorieen_US
dc.subject.stwInstitutionalismusen_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.subject.stwDeutschlanden_US
dc.titleThe Penalty-Duel and Institutional Design: Is there a Neeskens-Effect?en_US
dc.type|aWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn528420186en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:zbw:rwirep:4-

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