Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/267506 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2022
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Working Paper No. 041.2022
Verlag: 
Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM), Milano
Zusammenfassung: 
We perform a controlled experiment to study the welfare effects of competition in a strategic communication environment. Two equally informed senders with conflicting interests can misreport information at a cost. We compare a treatment where only one sender communicates to a treatment where both senders privately communicate with a decision-maker. Data show that competition between senders does not increase the amount of information decision-makers obtain. We find evidence of under-communication, as the information transmitted is lower than what theory predicts in the most informative equilibrium. Senders are worse off under competition because their relative gains from persuasion are more than offset by their expenditures in misreporting costs. As a result, competition between senders reduces the total welfare.
Schlagwörter: 
Experiment
Welfare
Multiple senders
Competition
Sender-receiver games
JEL: 
C72
C92
D60
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

Datei(en):
Datei
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