Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/267336 
Year of Publication: 
2022
Series/Report no.: 
CESifo Working Paper No. 10104
Publisher: 
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo), Munich
Abstract: 
Moral hazard' links geoengineering to mitigation via the fear that either solar geoengineering (solar radiation management, SRM) or carbon dioxide removal (CDR) might crowd out the desire to cut emissions. We test moral hazard versus its inverse in the first large-scale, revealed-preference experiments (n~340,000) and find that only extreme political messages lead to either outcome for some. Our results indicate the importance of actors and reasoned narratives of geoengineering to help guide public discourse.
Subjects: 
climate change
geoengineering
moral hazard
revealed preference
JEL: 
Q54
Q58
Document Type: 
Working Paper
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