Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/26668
Authors: 
Schöb, Ronnie
Thum, Marcel
Year of Publication: 
2009
Series/Report no.: 
CESifo working paper 2623
Abstract: 
We show that a minimum wage introduced in the presence of asymmetric information about worker productivities will lead to lower unemployment levels than predicted by the standard labour market model with heterogeneous labour and symmetric information.
Subjects: 
minimum wages
unemployment
asymmetric information
labour market regulation
JEL: 
J2
J3
H5
L5
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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