Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/266583 
Year of Publication: 
2022
Series/Report no.: 
SWP Comment No. 60/2022
Publisher: 
Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP), Berlin
Abstract: 
A close reading of Russia's nuclear statements and actions during the first seven months of its war against Ukraine reveals a threefold approach. Moscow is walking a fine line between a well-crafted and successful deterrence strategy to prevent foreign military intervention; a more modest and rather unsuccessful attempt at dissuading foreign aid to Ukraine and sanctions against Russia; and incremental nuclear coercion against Kyiv that spurred Western deterrence messaging in response. This analysis reveals a careful Russian approach, suggesting that cost-benefit calculations are likely to continue to render nuclear escalation unlikely. However, nuclear use cannot be fully discounted, particularly if war-related developments severely imperil the survival of Russia's regime.
Subjects: 
Russia
invasion of Ukraine
nuclear deterrence
nuclear weapons
dissuasion
compellence
NATO
United States
military intervention
sanctions
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Document Type: 
Research Report

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