Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/266556 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2022
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
SAFE White Paper No. 92
Verlag: 
Leibniz Institute for Financial Research SAFE, Frankfurt a. M.
Zusammenfassung: 
To ensure the credibility of market discipline induced by bail-in, neither retail investors nor peer banks should appear prominently among the investor base of banks' loss absorbing capital. Empirical evidence on bank-level data provided by the German Federal Financial Supervisory Authority raises a few red flags. Our list of policy recommendations encompasses disclosure policy, data sharing among supervisors, information transparency on holdings of bail-inable debt for all stakeholders, threshold values, and a well-defined upper limit for any bail-in activity. This document was provided by the Economic Governance Support Unit at the request of the ECON Committee.
Schlagwörter: 
Banking Union
Bailin
Retail Challenge
ISBN: 
978-92-846-9889-9
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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