Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/266556 
Year of Publication: 
2022
Series/Report no.: 
SAFE White Paper No. 92
Publisher: 
Leibniz Institute for Financial Research SAFE, Frankfurt a. M.
Abstract: 
To ensure the credibility of market discipline induced by bail-in, neither retail investors nor peer banks should appear prominently among the investor base of banks' loss absorbing capital. Empirical evidence on bank-level data provided by the German Federal Financial Supervisory Authority raises a few red flags. Our list of policy recommendations encompasses disclosure policy, data sharing among supervisors, information transparency on holdings of bail-inable debt for all stakeholders, threshold values, and a well-defined upper limit for any bail-in activity. This document was provided by the Economic Governance Support Unit at the request of the ECON Committee.
Subjects: 
Banking Union
Bailin
Retail Challenge
ISBN: 
978-92-846-9889-9
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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