Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/26647
Authors: 
Gächter, Simon
Nosenzo, Daniele
Renner, Elke
Sefton, Martin
Year of Publication: 
2009
Series/Report no.: 
CESifo working paper 2602
Abstract: 
We report an experiment comparing sequential and simultaneous contributions to a public good in a quasi-linear two-person setting (Varian, Journal of Public Economics, 1994). Our findings support the theoretical argument that sequential contributions result in lower overall provision than simultaneous contributions. However, the distribution of contributions is not as predicted: late contributors are sometimes willing to punish early low contributors by contributing less than their best response. This induces early contributors to contribute more than they otherwise would. A consequence of this is that we fail to observe a predicted first mover advantage.
Subjects: 
Public goods
voluntary contributions
sequential moves
experiment
JEL: 
C92
D03
H41
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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