Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/26598 
Full metadata record
Appears in Collections:
DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorBellettini, Giorgioen
dc.contributor.authorCeroni, Carlotta Bertien
dc.contributor.authorPrarolo, Giovannien
dc.date.accessioned2009-03-04-
dc.date.accessioned2009-07-28T08:48:46Z-
dc.date.available2009-07-28T08:48:46Z-
dc.date.issued2009-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/26598-
dc.description.abstractUsing data on a panel of 56 democratic countries in the period 1975-2004, we find evidence of a negative association between political stability and economic growth which is stronger and empirically more robust in countries with high bureaucratic costs. Motivated by these results, which contrast with previous contributions, we develop a model of growth with quality improvements where political connections with long-term politicians can be exploited by low-quality producers to defend their monopoly position and prevent innovation and entry of high-quality competitors. This requires that the incumbent politician remains in office and that the red-tape cost advantage granted by political connections is large relative to the quality upgrade related to innovation. Consistently with our empirical findings, the model delivers a negative association between the probability that the incumbent politician remains in office and average economic growth in the presence of high bureaucratic costs.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aCenter for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo) |cMunichen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aCESifo Working Paper |x2553en
dc.subject.jelO43en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordPolitical persistenceen
dc.subject.keywordgrowthen
dc.subject.keywordinnovationen
dc.subject.stwInteressenpolitiken
dc.subject.stwKorporatismusen
dc.subject.stwFolgekostenen
dc.subject.stwPolitische Stabilitäten
dc.subject.stwWirtschaftswachstumen
dc.subject.stwDemokratieen
dc.subject.stwTheorieen
dc.subject.stwWelten
dc.titlePolitical persistence, connections and economic growth-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn592901343en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

Files in This Item:
File
Size
274.46 kB





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.