Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/26581
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dc.contributor.authorMatschke, Xeniaen_US
dc.contributor.authorSchöttner, Anjaen_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-03-02en_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-07-28T08:48:34Z-
dc.date.available2009-07-28T08:48:34Z-
dc.date.issued2009en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/26581-
dc.description.abstractThis paper investigates the domestic government's antidumping duty choice in an asymmetric information framework where the foreign firm's cost is observed by the domestic firm, but not by the government. To induce truthful revelation, the government can design a tariff schedule, contingent on firms' cost reports, accompanied by a threat of auditing and implementing penalty duties. We show that the antidumping framework within GATT/WTO may not only offer the means to pursue strategic trade policy disguised as fair trade policy, but may also help overcome the informational problems with regard to determining the optimal strategic trade policy.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisher|aCenter for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute (CESifo) |cMunichen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aCESifo working paper|x2536en_US
dc.subject.jelF12en_US
dc.subject.jelF13en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordAntidumping dutiesen_US
dc.subject.keywordasymmetric informationen_US
dc.subject.keywordtrade protectionen_US
dc.subject.keywordstrategic trade policyen_US
dc.subject.stwAntidumpingen_US
dc.subject.stwStrategische Handelspolitiken_US
dc.subject.stwAsymmetrische Informationen_US
dc.subject.stwSpieltheorieen_US
dc.subject.stwWTO-Regelnen_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.subject.stwWelten_US
dc.titleAntidumping as strategic trade policy under asymmetric informationen_US
dc.type|aWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn592831612en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-

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