Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/26565 
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dc.contributor.authorValdés-Prieto, Salvadoren
dc.date.accessioned2009-02-25-
dc.date.accessioned2009-07-28T08:48:23Z-
dc.date.available2009-07-28T08:48:23Z-
dc.date.issued2009-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/26565-
dc.description.abstractChile approved in early 2008 the replacement of her two current non-contributory subsidies for the old poor for a unified program with a pioneering design, with phase-in ending in 2012. This paper describes the political economy of this reform and evaluates it with regards to efficiency and equity. The design is analogous to one adopted in Finland in 1957, with two differences: First, the subsidy withdrawal rate in response to the individual's contributory pension benefit is lower, about 30% rather than 50%. Second, preserving a tradition introduced in 1975, benefits are also withdrawn in response to per capita household income.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aCenter for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo) |cMunichen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aCESifo Working Paper |x2520en
dc.subject.jelH55en
dc.subject.jelH53en
dc.subject.jelI38en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordSocial securityen
dc.subject.keywordwelfare programsen
dc.subject.keywordpolitical economy of reformen
dc.subject.stwRentenreformen
dc.subject.stwPublic Choiceen
dc.subject.stwGesetzliche Rentenversicherungen
dc.subject.stwArmutspolitiken
dc.subject.stwAlte Menschenen
dc.subject.stwChileen
dc.titleThe 2008 Chilean reform to first-pillar pensions-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn592493423en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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