Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/26545 
Kompletter Metadatensatz
Erscheint in der Sammlung:
DublinCore-FeldWertSprache
dc.contributor.authorNiepelt, Dirken
dc.date.accessioned2009-02-18-
dc.date.accessioned2009-07-28T08:48:07Z-
dc.date.available2009-07-28T08:48:07Z-
dc.date.issued2008-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/26545-
dc.description.abstractI analyze how lack of commitment affects the maturity structure of sovereign debt. Governments balance benefits of default induced redistribution and costs due to income losses in the wake of a default. Their choice of short- versus long-term debt affects default and rollover decisions by subsequent policy makers. The equilibrium maturity structure is shaped by revenue losses on inframarginal units of debt that reflect the price impact of these decisions. The model predicts an interior maturity structure with positive gross positions and a shortening of the maturity structure when debt issuance is high, output low, or a cross default more likely. These predictions are consistent with empirical evidence.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aCenter for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo) |cMunichen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aCESifo Working Paper |x2500en
dc.subject.jelE62en
dc.subject.jelF34en
dc.subject.jelH63en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordDebten
dc.subject.keywordmaturity structureen
dc.subject.keywordno commitmenten
dc.subject.keyworddefaulten
dc.subject.stwÖffentliche Anleiheen
dc.subject.stwLaufzeiten
dc.subject.stwDebt Managementen
dc.subject.stwSteuerpolitiken
dc.subject.stwKreditrisikoen
dc.subject.stwSoziale Kostenen
dc.subject.stwTheorieen
dc.titleDebt maturity without commitment-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn592002136en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.