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Erscheinungsjahr: 
2022
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
ZEW Discussion Papers No. 22-049
Verlag: 
ZEW - Leibniz-Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung, Mannheim
Zusammenfassung: 
We study consumer debt relief as a tool of distributive politics and ask if debt relief can influence elections. We utilize quasi-experimental variation generated by a very large debt relief program enacted in the Republic of Georgia by a private foundation that affected every sixth voter. We estimate that the program helped the incumbent candidate linked to the foundation win the 2018 Presidential election, and that its effects persisted into the next election. We show how economic power can translate into political power in polities with de jure competitive elections but with de facto weak accountability.
Schlagwörter: 
Consumer debt relief
distributive politics
vote buying
elections
JEL: 
D72
E51
O10
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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