Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/265422 
Year of Publication: 
2022
Series/Report no.: 
ZEW Discussion Papers No. 22-049
Publisher: 
ZEW - Leibniz-Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung, Mannheim
Abstract: 
We study consumer debt relief as a tool of distributive politics and ask if debt relief can influence elections. We utilize quasi-experimental variation generated by a very large debt relief program enacted in the Republic of Georgia by a private foundation that affected every sixth voter. We estimate that the program helped the incumbent candidate linked to the foundation win the 2018 Presidential election, and that its effects persisted into the next election. We show how economic power can translate into political power in polities with de jure competitive elections but with de facto weak accountability.
Subjects: 
Consumer debt relief
distributive politics
vote buying
elections
JEL: 
D72
E51
O10
Document Type: 
Working Paper

Files in This Item:
File
Size





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.