Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/26528
Authors: 
Frey, Bruno S.
Torgler, Benno
Year of Publication: 
2008
Series/Report no.: 
CESifo working paper 2483
Abstract: 
In the course of history, a large number of politicians have been assassinated. Rational choice hypotheses are developed and tested using panel data covering more than 100 countries over a period of 20 years. Several strategies, in addition to security measures, are shown to significantly reduce the probability of politicians being attacked or killed: extended institutional and governance quality, democracy, voice and accountability, a well functioning system of law and order, decentralization via the division of power and federalism, larger cabinet size and strengthened civil society. There is also support for a contagion effect.
Subjects: 
Assassinations
rational choice
governance
democracy
dictatorship
deterrence
protection
JEL: 
D01
D70
K14
K42
Z10
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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