Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/265226 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2022
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Bank of Canada Staff Working Paper No. 2022-32
Verlag: 
Bank of Canada, Ottawa
Zusammenfassung: 
Financial markets face the constant threat of cyber attacks. We develop a principal-agent model of cyber-attacking with fee-paying clients who delegate security decisions to financial platforms. We derive testable implications about clients' vulnerability to cyber attacks and about the fees charged. We characterize which cyber attacks actors choose. We find that ransomware attacks are more successful than traditional attacks and that platforms underinvest in security when security is unobservable. Regulating security investment (e.g., minimum security standards) or improving transparency (e.g., security ratings) can improve welfare. Our results support regulatory efforts to increase transparency around cyber security and cyber attacks.
Schlagwörter: 
Economic Models
Financial System Regulation and Policies
Financial Services
Financial Stability
Payment Clearing and Settlement Systems
JEL: 
D78
D81
G18
G21
G23
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Dokumentart: 
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