Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/265169 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2022
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Quaderni - Working Paper DSE No. 1170
Verlag: 
Alma Mater Studiorum - Università di Bologna, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche (DSE), Bologna
Zusammenfassung: 
We rationalize several facts emerging from the recent empirical research on cooperatives owned by workers (workers' firms, WF) as: the concern of WFs for employment; the interplay between membership and workplace safeguard within WFs; the different reaction to shocks between WFs and profit-making firms. We do so by means of a new model of WFs short-run behavior in mixed duopoly. We consider an industry in which a WF competes with a profit maximizing company and we innovate with respect to the conventional Illyrian objective function. We then reconcile the literature on labor-concerned maximands in competitive markets and the one dealing with WFs in oligopolistic markets under the Illyrian maximand.
Schlagwörter: 
workers firm
employment
oligopoly
JEL: 
L13
L21
P13
Persistent Identifier der Erstveröffentlichung: 
Creative-Commons-Lizenz: 
cc-by-nc Logo
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe
781.33 kB





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.