Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/265169 
Year of Publication: 
2022
Series/Report no.: 
Quaderni - Working Paper DSE No. 1170
Publisher: 
Alma Mater Studiorum - Università di Bologna, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche (DSE), Bologna
Abstract: 
We rationalize several facts emerging from the recent empirical research on cooperatives owned by workers (workers' firms, WF) as: the concern of WFs for employment; the interplay between membership and workplace safeguard within WFs; the different reaction to shocks between WFs and profit-making firms. We do so by means of a new model of WFs short-run behavior in mixed duopoly. We consider an industry in which a WF competes with a profit maximizing company and we innovate with respect to the conventional Illyrian objective function. We then reconcile the literature on labor-concerned maximands in competitive markets and the one dealing with WFs in oligopolistic markets under the Illyrian maximand.
Subjects: 
workers firm
employment
oligopoly
JEL: 
L13
L21
P13
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
cc-by-nc Logo
Document Type: 
Working Paper

Files in This Item:
File
Size
781.33 kB





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.