Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
https://hdl.handle.net/10419/26505
Full metadata record
DC Field | Value | Language |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.author | Frydman, Carola | en |
dc.date.accessioned | 2009-01-12 | - |
dc.date.accessioned | 2009-07-28T08:47:38Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2009-07-28T08:47:38Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2008 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/26505 | - |
dc.description.abstract | In recent years, a large academic debate has tried to explain the rapid rise in CEO pay experienced over the past three decades. In this article, I review the main proposed theories, which span views of compensation as the result of a competitive labor market for executives to theories based on excess of managerial power. Some of these hypotheses have found support in cross-sectional evidence, but it has proven more difficult to determine which factors have caused the observed changes in pay over time. An alternative strategy is to evaluate the fit of plausible explanations out of sample by contrasting them with the evolution in executive pay and the market for managers during earlier time periods. A case study of General Electric suggests that evidence for earlier decades can speak to the recent trends and reveals the limitations of current explanations to address the long-run data. | en |
dc.language.iso | eng | en |
dc.publisher | |aCenter for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo) |cMunich | en |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | |aCESifo Working Paper |x2460 | en |
dc.subject.jel | J33 | en |
dc.subject.jel | M52 | en |
dc.subject.jel | N32 | en |
dc.subject.ddc | 330 | en |
dc.subject.keyword | Executive compensation | en |
dc.subject.keyword | managerial incentives | en |
dc.subject.keyword | corporate governance | en |
dc.subject.keyword | market for managers | en |
dc.subject.stw | Führungskräfte | en |
dc.subject.stw | Gehalt | en |
dc.subject.stw | Qualifikation | en |
dc.subject.stw | Wettbewerb | en |
dc.subject.stw | Corporate Governance | en |
dc.subject.stw | Geschichte | en |
dc.subject.stw | USA | en |
dc.title | Learning from the past: trends in executive compensation over the twentieth century | - |
dc.type | Working Paper | en |
dc.identifier.ppn | 589229532 | en |
dc.rights | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | en |
Files in This Item:
Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.