Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/26484
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dc.contributor.authorBattistin, Erichen_US
dc.contributor.authorGraziano, Claraen_US
dc.contributor.authorParigi, Bruno Mariaen_US
dc.date.accessioned2008-11-12en_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-07-28T08:47:23Z-
dc.date.available2009-07-28T08:47:23Z-
dc.date.issued2008en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/26484-
dc.description.abstractIn this paper we study top executive turnover in Italian Banks over the period 1993-2001. We relate the probability of survival of top executives (Presidents, CEOs and General Managers) to bank performance and the manager's local connections, controlling for (observable and unobservable) bank and manager characteristics by exploiting longitudinal information on bank-manager appointments. We measure the extent? of managers' local connections by the distance between the province of the bank's headquarters and the manager's province of birth. We show that top managers tend to be local in the sense that the distribution of this distance is heavily skewed towards zero. On the basis of this evidence, we address two questions. First, we investigate whether connections affect the duration of the appointment at the bank. Second, we ask whether connections entrench managers at the expense of the bank's performance. We find that connections generally increase the probabilities of managers surviving at their banks, and that the positive effect of performance on tenure (as amply documented by the executive turnover literature) disappears once connections are taken into account. On the other hand, we provide evidence against the hypothesis that managerial connections contain information valuable for enhancing a bank's performance. In particular, we find that highly connected boards cause the shorter survival of banks, and that those who benefit from connections are top managers themselves (mostly Presidents and General Managers). This suggests that connections may be collusion devices with which to maintain and share rents.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisher|aCenter for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute (CESifo) |cMunichen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aCESifo working paper|x2439en_US
dc.subject.jelJ40en_US
dc.subject.jelJ63en_US
dc.subject.jelG21en_US
dc.subject.jelG34en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordConnectionsen_US
dc.subject.keywordexecutive turnoveren_US
dc.subject.keywordcommercial and cooperative banksen_US
dc.subject.stwBankmanageren_US
dc.subject.stwArbeitsmobilitäten_US
dc.subject.stwBanken_US
dc.subject.stwUnternehmensentwicklungen_US
dc.subject.stwSoziales Netzwerken_US
dc.subject.stwKreditgenossenschaften_US
dc.subject.stwItalienen_US
dc.titleConnections and performance in bankers' turnover: better wed over the mixen than over the mooren_US
dc.type|aWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn584727771en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-

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