Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/26482
Full metadata record
DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorDelfgaauw, Josseen_US
dc.contributor.authorDur, Roberten_US
dc.date.accessioned2008-11-12en_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-07-28T08:47:21Z-
dc.date.available2009-07-28T08:47:21Z-
dc.date.issued2008en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/26482-
dc.description.abstractThe quality of public management is a recurrent concern in many countries. Calls to attract the economy's best and brightest managers to the public sector abound. This paper studies self-selection into managerial and non-managerial positions in the public and private sector, using a model of a perfectly competitive economy where people differ in managerial ability and in public service motivation. We find that, if demand for public sector output is not too high, the equilibrium return to managerial ability is always highest in the private sector. As a result, relatively many of the more able managers self-select into the private sector. Since this outcome is efficient, our analysis implies that attracting a more able managerial workforce to the public sector by increasing remuneration to private-sector levels is not cost-efficient.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisher|aCenter for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute (CESifo) |cMunichen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aCESifo working paper|x2437en_US
dc.subject.jelH83en_US
dc.subject.jelJ24en_US
dc.subject.jelJ3en_US
dc.subject.jelJ45en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordPublic managementen_US
dc.subject.keywordpublic service motivationen_US
dc.subject.keywordmanagerial abilityen_US
dc.subject.keywordself-selectionen_US
dc.subject.stwFührungskräfteen_US
dc.subject.stwQualifikationen_US
dc.subject.stwLeistungsmotivationen_US
dc.subject.stwArbeitsmobilitäten_US
dc.subject.stwÖffentlicher Sektoren_US
dc.subject.stwVergleichen_US
dc.subject.stwPrivatwirtschaften_US
dc.subject.stwVollkommener Wettbewerben_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.titleManagerial talent, motivation, and self-selection into public managementen_US
dc.type|aWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn584727321en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-

Files in This Item:
File
Size
529.58 kB





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.