Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/264715 
Autor:innen: 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2006
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Working Paper No. 123
Verlag: 
Oesterreichische Nationalbank (OeNB), Vienna
Zusammenfassung: 
Despite the recent trend towards greater transparency of monetary policy, in many respects mystique still prevails in central bank speak. This paper shows that the resulting perception of ambiguity could be desirable. Under the plausible assumption of imperfect common knowledge about the degree of central bank transparency, economic outcomes are affected by both the actual and perceived degree of transparency. It is shown that actual transparency is beneficial while it may be useful to create the perception of opacity. The optimal communication strategy for the central bank is to provide clarity about the inflation target and to communicate information about the output target and supply shocks with perceived ambiguity. In this respect, the central bank benefits from sustaining transparency misperceptions, which helps to explain the mystique of central bank speak.
Schlagwörter: 
Transparency
monetary policy
communication
JEL: 
E52
E58
D82
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe
477.04 kB





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.