Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/264580 
Year of Publication: 
2021
Citation: 
[Journal:] British Journal of Industrial Relations [ISSN:] 1467-8543 [Volume:] 60 [Issue:] 2 [Publisher:] Wiley Periodicals, Inc. [Place:] Hoboken, USA [Year:] 2021 [Pages:] 424-443
Publisher: 
Wiley Periodicals, Inc., Hoboken, USA
Abstract: 
Using data from the representative IAB Establishment Panel in Germany and estimating a heteroskedastic probit model with fixed effects, this paper finds a negative relationship between the existence of owner‐management in an establishment and the probabilities of having a works council or a collective bargaining agreement. We show that family firms which are solely managed by the owners or by external executives significantly differ in the presence of these kinds of worker representation. The probabilities of having works councils and (company‐level) collective agreements increase substantially if just some of the managers do not belong to the owner family. We argue that these differences cannot simply be attributed to an aversion of the owners against co‐determination and unions but suggest taking account of the notion of socio‐emotional wealth prevalent in family firms. In addition, our results support the idea that external managers mainly act as agents rather than stewards in family firms.
Subjects: 
co‐determination
colletive agreement
family firm
Germany
Industrial relations
works council
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
cc-by Logo
Document Type: 
Article
Document Version: 
Published Version

Files in This Item:
File
Size





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.