Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/26458
Authors: 
Upmann, Thorsten
Year of Publication: 
2008
Series/Report no.: 
CESifo working paper 2413
Abstract: 
In this paper we investigate trade union formation. To this end we apply a model with two types of labour where the interests of both groups of labourers are represented by either a joint (industry) labour union or by two independent group-specific (professional) labour unions. We investigate whether, and if so, under which conditions, it is beneficial for at least one group of labourers to form its own independent union; or whether it is in the interest of both groups to have a joint industry labour union. Applying the (asymmetric) Nash bargaining solution, we find that under reasonable conditions, it is beneficial for at least one group of labourers to form its own independent labour union. In this case a joint union must be considered as an unstable institution. The profit share, however, is always higher if the firm bargains with a joint labour union. This explains why employers vehemently oppose recent split offs of specialized labour groups from existing industry unions and from tariff unions.
Subjects: 
Trade-union formation
wage-employment bargains
Nash bargaining solution
industry and professional labour unions
trade union merger
JEL: 
C78
J41
J51
Document Type: 
Working Paper

Files in This Item:
File
Size
362.43 kB





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.