Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/26447 
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dc.contributor.authorLlense, Fabienneen
dc.date.accessioned2008-09-16-
dc.date.accessioned2009-07-28T08:31:59Z-
dc.date.available2009-07-28T08:31:59Z-
dc.date.issued2008-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/26447-
dc.description.abstractIn the middle of the nineties, the sharp increase in globalisation and the last privatization wave have promoted the shaping of a market for executives in France. Characteristics of this market are estimated for France and a competitive model is simulated in order to assess to what extend such a model could explain the observed CEO compensations. The size elasticity of compensation in France is equal to 0.5 and justifies a large magnitude in compensation. To moderate those compensations, a wage cap is often called for by opinion and the European left but also, more surprisingly, by representative of shareholders. The cost of this policy is evaluated in this sorting model and the lobbying of shareholders is explained.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aCenter for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo) |cMunichen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aCESifo Working Paper |x2402en
dc.subject.jelJ31en
dc.subject.jelJ33en
dc.subject.jelD33en
dc.subject.jelD41en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.stwFührungskräfteen
dc.subject.stwGehalten
dc.subject.stwVergütungssystemen
dc.subject.stwRegulierungen
dc.subject.stwWirtschaftspolitische Wirkungsanalyseen
dc.subject.stwFührungskräfteauswahlen
dc.subject.stwMatchingen
dc.subject.stwBetriebsgrößeen
dc.subject.stwTheorieen
dc.subject.stwFrankreichen
dc.titleFrench CEO compensations: what is the cost of a mandatory upper limit?-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn577849034en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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