Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/26434 
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dc.contributor.authorHefeker, Carstenen
dc.contributor.authorZimmer, Blandineen
dc.date.accessioned2008-09-11-
dc.date.accessioned2009-07-28T08:31:50Z-
dc.date.available2009-07-28T08:31:50Z-
dc.date.issued2008-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/26434-
dc.description.abstractThe paper examines the monetary-fiscal interactions in a monetary union model with uncertainty due to imperfect central bank transparency. We first show that monetary uncertainty disciplines fiscal policymakers and thereby reduces taxes, average inflation and output distortions. However, as more members enter the monetary union, the fiscal disciplining effect of uncertainty is mitigated. As a consequence, monetary union enlargement may lead to a more aggressive fiscal stance in some member countries, depending on their relative economic and political weights, on their government's spending target, and on the change in the degree of uncertainty that they experience with the enlargement.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aCenter for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo) |cMunichen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aCESifo Working Paper |x2389en
dc.subject.jelE58en
dc.subject.jelE63en
dc.subject.jelF36en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.stwGeldpolitiken
dc.subject.stwUnvollkommene Informationen
dc.subject.stwRisikoen
dc.subject.stwFinanzpolitiken
dc.subject.stwEntscheidung bei Unsicherheiten
dc.subject.stwWährungsunionen
dc.subject.stwTheorieen
dc.titleUncertainty and fiscal policy in an asymmetric monetary union-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn577510800en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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