Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/26414 
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dc.contributor.authorGersbach, Hansen
dc.contributor.authorHaller, Hansen
dc.date.accessioned2008-09-09-
dc.date.accessioned2009-07-28T08:31:35Z-
dc.date.available2009-07-28T08:31:35Z-
dc.date.issued2008-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/26414-
dc.description.abstractWe We integrate individual power in groups into general equilibrium models. The relationship between group formation, resource allocation, and the power of specific individuals or particular sociological groups is investigated. We introduce, via an illustrative example, three appealing concepts of power and show that there is no monotonic relationship between these concepts. Then we examine existence of competitive equilibria with free exit and study whether maximal individual power is consistent with Pareto efficiency. As applications, we discuss when power spillovers occur and we identify human relation paradoxes: positive externalities increase, but none of the household members gains in equilibrium. We further identify implicit, determinate and de facto power.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aCenter for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo) |cMunichen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aCESifo Working Paper |x2369en
dc.subject.jelD41en
dc.subject.jelD50en
dc.subject.jelD60en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordgroup formationen
dc.subject.keywordcompetitive marketsen
dc.subject.keywordpoweren
dc.subject.keywordexiten
dc.subject.stwGruppentheorieen
dc.subject.stwWirtschaftliche Machten
dc.subject.stwAllgemeines Gleichgewichten
dc.subject.stwMarktaustritten
dc.subject.stwPareto-Optimumen
dc.subject.stwTheorieen
dc.titleExit and power in general equilibrium-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn605166129en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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