Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/26399 
Full metadata record
Appears in Collections:
DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorBlackburn, Keithen
dc.contributor.authorNeanidis, Kyriakos C.en
dc.contributor.authorHaque, M. Emranulen
dc.date.accessioned2008-09-08-
dc.date.accessioned2009-07-28T08:31:24Z-
dc.date.available2009-07-28T08:31:24Z-
dc.date.issued2008-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/26399-
dc.description.abstractThis paper presents an analysis of the effect of bureaucratic corruption on economic growth through a public finance transmission channel. At the theoretical level, we develop a simple dynamic general equilibrium model in which financial intermediaries make portfolio decisions on behalf of agents, and bureaucrats collect tax revenues on behalf of the government. Corruption takes the form of the embezzlement of public funds, the effect of which is to increase the government's reliance on seigniorage finance. This leads to an increase in inflation which, in turn, reduces capital accumulation and growth. At the empirical level, we use data on 82 countries over a 20-year period to test the predictions of our model. Taking proper account of the government's budget constraint, we find strong evidence to support these predictions under different estimation strategies. Our results are robust to a wide range of sensitivity tests.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aCenter for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo) |cMunichen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aCESifo Working Paper |x2354en
dc.subject.jelE6en
dc.subject.jelH6en
dc.subject.jelO16en
dc.subject.jelO17en
dc.subject.jelO42en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordCorruptionen
dc.subject.keywordseigniorageen
dc.subject.keywordinflationen
dc.subject.keywordgrowthen
dc.subject.stwKorruptionen
dc.subject.stwSteueraufkommenen
dc.subject.stwBetrugen
dc.subject.stwMünzgewinnen
dc.subject.stwInflationen
dc.subject.stwWirtschaftswachstumen
dc.subject.stwTheorieen
dc.subject.stwSchätzungen
dc.subject.stwWelten
dc.titleCorruption, seigniorage and growth: theory and evidence-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn577087983en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

Files in This Item:
File
Size
855.71 kB





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.