Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/263943 
Year of Publication: 
2022
Series/Report no.: 
Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper No. TI 2022-023/I
Publisher: 
Tinbergen Institute, Amsterdam and Rotterdam
Abstract: 
This paper studies intertemporal social preferences. We introduce intertemporal dictator and ultimatum games where players decide on the timing of monetary payoffs. The setting is two-dimensional rather than one-dimensional, in the sense that inequalities can arise in the time as well as in the social dimension. The results of our experiment show that for equal monetary payoffs, decisions regarding waiting time show similar patterns as decisions regarding monetary payoffs in the standard games. Moreover, decisions regarding waiting time depend on inequalities in monetary payoffs in a systematic way, with this dependence being more pronounced in ultimatum than in dictator games.
Subjects: 
Social preferences
time preferences
dictator game
ultimatum game
Document Type: 
Working Paper

Files in This Item:
File
Size
635.76 kB





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.